

Targeted Memory Runtime Analysis

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Agenda

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Introduction

- Memory issues in C/C++ are still prevalent
 - Use-after-free
 - Memory leaks
 - Out-of-bound writes
 - And much more...



Related Works

- Adress Sanitizer
 - Uses shadow memory
 - Memory impact is too big for embarked systems
- Datawatch
 - Taint pointers stored in unused bits



Our approach

- X86_64 architecture
- Minimal approach to recreate datawatch:
 - Overwrite the *malloc/realloc* to add a taint.
 - Tainted pointers: use bits 47 to 63 for pointer tainting.





- X86_64 architecture
- Minimal approach to recreate datawatch:
 - SIGSEGV as a handler to catch the tainted address.

• For now, resume the flow of the program by removing the taint.



System Call Tainted Pointers: Problem

• System call arguments can be tainted.

• However, they are not handled by our SIGSEGV handler, as the system call is resolved in the kernel space

```
ptr = taint(20, tag_data);
```

nW = write(1, ptr, sizeof(int)); // Not handled by our SIGSEGV handler



System Call Tainted Pointers: Solution

• Kernel patching

• Light modifications: 2 functions added, and calls to that function in 4 other files.





• Allocate a 4 byte pointer (using our malloc hook)

• Read/write using this tainted pointer as our argument

• Access the tainted pointer (generates a SIGSEGV signal)



Demo





• Tainting pointers will not occupy more space since it uses unused bits

• However, tainting pointers for every memory allocation will significantly slow down our program.



- Use the upper 16 bits to store useful information:
 - Object id: identify objects more prone to memory errors

• **Targeted** memory analysis

• Bounds checking with Olivier's libpatch library

